Thucydides is an important author for any discussion of the possibilities for an ancient Greek democratic peace. Though democratic peace did not, in fact, seem to function in classical Greece, a number of passages in Thucydides show that an affinity did exist among democratic factions and city-states in the context of hostile competition between democratic and oligarchic regimes. Thucydides remarked on this competition and was aware of the inter-democratic affinities, but did not seem to think them salient in city-state decisions of war and peace. The failure of democratic peace to develop may relate to the environment of the Greek city-state, which privileged local interests over broader constitutional ideals.
INTRODUCTION
Democratic peace -the hypothesis that democracies never, or very rarely, go to war with one another -could not be more relevant to international affairs than they seem to be at present. An obvious sign of this is the increasing stridency with which the President of the United States has pushed the notion that liberal governments bring peace, and that American security and freedom depends upon spreading democracy around the world. While critics might note that President Bush's policies seem to feature going to war to achieve this peace, it is nevertheless significant that the President frequently voices the expectation that more democracies will result in a the ancient version. The point was not to say that democratic peace as a general theory was wrong, but merely that it did not seem to apply to the ancient world.
The present paper will revisit this issue and attempt to discover why democratic peace did not function by focusing on Thucydides, the subject of this special issue and the PRIO conference from which it stems. Thucydides is a central author in the argument about a Greek democratic peace, and it will be illuminating to probe a little farther than did my earlier article into his understanding of and reports about wars, alliances, and popular governments in his time. (I will not attempt, as does Russett in this issue, a more generalized look at factors potentially inhibiting an ancient democratic peace.) One finds a curious tension in Thucydides when trying to apply the notion of democratic peace to his writing: on the one hand, as the spiritual father of the realist school of international affairs, 5 his outlook does not readily accommodate the retrojection of the rather idealist notion of democratic peace; on the other hand, evidence in his history can indeed be found for a cooperative relationship of some kind between democratic factions and polities. Sorting out how and why this cooperative relationship existed without democratic peace itself emerging is the goal of this paper.
THE ABSENCE OF AN ANCIENT DEMOCRATIC PEACE
To summarize briefly the argument made in my previous article, it started by contending that the ancient world is an entirely appropriate era to investigate with regard to the issue given the striking similarity of democratic ideals ancient and modern. In both eras the same two principles, freedom and equality, are touted as the supreme principles of a democratic state. For example, democracies ancient and modern place great value on collective freedom from domination by an oppressive ruler or ruling class, individual freedom to live as one wishes, and equal treatment of citizens before the law. Of course, the manner of implementation of these ideals and the social contexts in which they flourish vary dramatically (as they must any time one compares political arrangements in distant historical eras). As we will see later in this paper, the variation in context -especially the Greek city-state (polis) settingmay offer a possible explanation for the main conclusion of my earlier study, which was that democratic peace does not seem to have obtained in classical Greece.
Contrary to what investigators Bruce Russett & William Antholis (1992 , 1993 and
Spencer Weart (1998) The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardor which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry.
For those who emerged as party leaders in the several cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as its catch-word 'political equality for the masses' (plēthous isonomias politikēs) the other 'prudent aristocracy' (aristokratias sōphronos)
while they pretended to be devoted to the common weal, in reality made it their prize.
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Thucydides in this section has been describing the traumatic civil strife at Corcyra with more horrified passion and greater detail than he devotes to any other such conflict covered in his history; clearly, he intends the account to stand as a searing example of the nature of this kind of struggle, one that he states (here and elsewhere) was cropping up all across Greece during the course of the long Peloponnesian War.
For our purposes, we must note the assertion that, in general, democratic factions sought to bring in Athenian aid, and oligarchic ones Spartan aid. This assertion fits well with claims made in various classical authors that Athens tended to support democracies and Sparta oligarchies, 8 and establishes a clear affinity between democratic Athens and factions fighting for democratic government in their own states. But two wrinkles must also be noted: Thucydides emphasizes the effect of the larger war between Athens and Sparta in triggering this sort of partisan conflict and competitive intervention by greater powers: without it, leaders would not have the excuse (or even the desire?) to call for aid. He also stresses the small-minded motives of the various factional leaders, however grand their slogans may sound. We will return to these points later.
Another potentially revealing passage in Thucydides comes as he describes the For the sake of comparison, let us briefly consider another ancient author, Xenophon, whose history of Greece picks up where Thucydides' war account ends and then continues to cover Greek events for a few decades after the end of the Peloponnesian War. While it is apparent from Xenophon's descriptions that the polarization of democratic and oligarchic states continued and remained a factor in fueling a number of wars and revolutions of the early fourth century, he too prefers to stress other factors in explaining why fighting broke out or persisted, to include the desire for state freedom and autonomy, the chances of winning or losing, past injuries, past loyalty or services, or Greek unity in opposing non-Greeks. 12 Often, he is surprisingly vague about governmental change or constitutional factors in describing the outcomes of wars when one state conquers another. 13 Given that he certainly was aware of the continuing democratic/oligarchic polarization, it is worth noting that he, like Thucydides, seemed to think it less important a factor for bringing about war or peace than other motivating forces.
The conclusion that one should draw from all this ancient testimony is that contemporary Greek observers certainly understood that tensions between competing democratic and oligarchic models of polis governance frequently spilled over into the realm of war, civil strife, and alliance-making in the fifth and fourth centuries. 14 A key aspect of ancient democratic behavior that may help us toward an explanation comes out of Thucydides' history -or rather, it is something that, strikingly, does not come out. One would search in vain in Thucydides for evidence of a conviction among Greek democrats that democracy should be promoted for its own sake. That is, one detects no sense of mission in ancient democracies that we read of in Thucydides (or in other ancient texts) to spread the gospel, as it were, so more
Greeks could enjoy the benefits that the democratically governed felt themselves. 15 Its absence is particularly striking in Thucydides' report of Pericles' funeral oration, probably the most famous encomium to a democratic government from all of antiquity: Pericles heaps praise on Athens for (among other things) its constitution, claiming that it was a more a model (paradeigma) for others than it was copied from others (2.37.1), but nowhere suggests that Athens had -or should have -striven to promote it abroad. Nor does any hint of such a sentiment appear elsewhere in Thucydides' history or others'. The contrast with the modern world, or at least the modern United States, is striking. For decades now, it has been taken as a given that the U.S. seeks to promote democracy around the world (even if inconsistently, or at the point of a gun) as a basic tenet in its foreign policy. The recent broadcasting of this mission by the Bush administration in prominent speeches and policy statements only highlights a longstanding U.S. goal shared by both major political parties.
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The absence of a comparable messianic drive among ancient Greek democrats signals, one may suppose, a different conception of constitutional ideals and their importance within the polis setting. Just as no democratic city-state, however happy it may have been with its form of government, felt the need to promote the idea abroad for the sake of the idea, so no democratic city-state would automatically sympathize with -to the extent of avoiding hostilities with -a fellow democracy simply because of its democracy. Perhaps the Greeks believed that constitutional types had little to do with a citizen body's fundamental character, and it is the character of a people (combined with polis self-interest) to which Thucydidean speeches for or against war constantly appeal. 17 After all, Greek city-state governments of all constitutional stripes were far smaller and far more directly connected to the people themselves than modern states with all their governmental apparatus. 18 Thus the major factors we hear of for going to war in Thucydides (such as land disputes or past injuries or hegemonic ambitions) seemed far more immediate and illustrative of a neighboring population's threat or worth than the manner of internal procedures it may have used to decide to act the way it did. To be sure, the decision-makers of states of one constitutional type seem to have found it easier to work with or trust those in a similar political milieu when considering alliances: democratic politicians or indeed the ruling dēmos itself in a democracy would have no qualms about conducting business with their equivalent in another democracy, whereas (the book 5
evidence from Thucydides seems to show) there was a deficit of such ready trust on the part of oligarchic leaders in making deals with popularly ruled city-states. But a systemic affinity among democratic actors, lacking any larger dedication to the ideal of democracy across Greece, could not trump the more immediate imperatives (potential threat, past injury, polis character, sworn alliances, etc.) that led the small, locally oriented Greek communities to make war on one another.
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The absence of devotion to abstract constitutional principle -or perhaps, more precisely, the inability of any such attachment to overcome the intensely local perspective of the Greek polis -would help explain how it is that, in Thucydides' accounts, internal democratic/oligarchic struggles can have such a prominent place in the prosecution of wars and yet get so little explicit play in discussions of causes.
Recall in the passages from book 3 noted earlier in this paper how Thucydides qualifies the importance of factional struggles in the Corcyrean civil war: it took the existence of the larger war between Athens and Sparta to spark these vicious internal conflicts in the first place; and even once they broke out, the alleged agendas of the participants (democracy or oligarchy, expressed via whatever specious slogans they might use) mattered little, for the truth was that winning personal power in their local community motivated them, not allegiance to higher constitutional ideals.
A lesser degree of attachment to political causes beyond the arena of the polis would also explain how it was that interstate democratic connections -which clearly did exist -were ignored so often when faced with the prospect of war. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration is the episode leading most directly to the Peloponnesian War itself: the conflict between Epidamnus, Corcyra, and Corinth, described by 19 It is worth emphasizing here that the apparent Greek failure to prioritize broad, panHellenic democratic ideals over local considerations of interest need not indicate any lesser Greek attachment to democratic ideals within their own polis. As noted earlier in the paper, a strong allegiance to strikingly similar democratic principles as are practiced in the modern world (freedom, equality) characterize ancient democracies: the evidence from antiquity does not suggest that within the Greek polis internal democratic ideals were somehow undervalued.
